It is usually assumed in game theory that agents who interact strategically with each other are rational, know the strategies open to other agents as well as their payoffs and, moreover, have common knowledge of all the above. In some games, that much information is sufficient for the players to identify a "solution" and play it. The most commonly adopted solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
It is usually assumed in game theory that agents who interact strategically with each other are rational, know the strategies open to other agents as well as their payoffs and, moreover, have common knowledge of all the above. In some games, that much information is sufficient for the players to identify a "solution" and play it. The most commonly adopted solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium is defined a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can profit from a deviation from his strategy if the opponents stick to their strategies. Nash equilibrium is taken to have predictive power, in the sense that in order to predict how rational agents will in fact behave, it is enough to identify the equilibrium patterns of actions. Barring the case in which players have dominant strategies, to play her part in a Nash equilibrium a player must believe that the other players play their part, too. But an intelligent player must immediately realize that she has no ground for this belief. Take To predict the outcome of someone's belief revision process one has to know, among other things, the revisor's rules for belief revision, as well as her explanatory and predictive interests. I shall assume that the rules for belief revision, as well as the criterion of informational value, are shared by the players.
The rules for belief revision specify a criterion of equilibrium selection; if this criterion identifies a unique equilibrium as the solution for the game, then players who have common knowledge of rationality, of the shared rules for belief revision and the shared criterion of informational value can identify their equilibrium strategies. In this case, players' beliefs will be both correct and common knowledge.
The case of a unique Nash equilibrium is straightforward, since whenever there is a unique solution for the game this solution is a fortiori the one selected by belief revision. The interesting case is that in which there are multiple Nash equilibria, some of which might be implausible in that they involve "risky" strategies and the implausible beliefs that those strategies will be played. Various "refinements" of Nash equilibrium have been proposed to take care of implausible equilibria, as well as to attain predictability in the face of multiple equilibria. These 
Threats
To model belief formation, it is useful to consider the dynamic structure of games, the order in which players move and the kind of information they have when they have to make a choice. Briefly, the extensive form of a game specifies the following information: a finite set of players i = 1, ... n, one of which might be nature (N); the order of moves; the players' choices at each move and what each player knows when she has to choose; the players 1 payoffs as a function of their moves; finally, moves by nature correspond to probability distributions over exogenous events. The order of play is represented by a game tree T, which is a finite set of partially ordered nodes t 6 T that satisfy a precedence relation denoted by M <".
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The information a player has when he is choosing an action is represented using information sets, which partition the nodes of the tree. Since an information set can contain more than one node, the player who has to make a choice at an information set that contains, say, nodes t and t 1 will be uncertain as to which node he is at. 3 The relation < is asymmetric, transitive, and satisfies the following property: if t < t M and t f < t" and t * t\ then either t < t 1 or t 1 < t. These assumptions imply that the precedence relation is only a partial order, in that two nodes may not be comparable, and that each node (except the initial node) has just one immediate predecessor, so that each node is a complete description of the path preceding it. When a node is not a predecessor of any node we call it a "terminal node". 4 If t and t' belong to the same information set, we require that the same player moves at t and t 1 . Also, a player must have the same set of choices at each node belonging to the same information set.
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The game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (L,l) and (R,r). In the normal form representation of the game (figure 2), there is no way to predict with confidence which pair of actions will be chosen by the players, at least if one remains agnostic about their beliefs. 
Backward Induction
The methodology employed here is more complex than that used to verify that an agreement is a Nash equilibrium. In the latter case, one asks whether it would be All that condition (R) tells us is that whenever a player has a weakly dominated strategy he should not be expected to use it, and that no one should choose a strategy that is a best reply to a dominated strategy. In other words, it must be common knowledge that weakly dominated strategies will not be used. In many games, common knowledge of rationality is not even needed to rule out dominated strategies. In figure 1, So if a node is reached one asks why a deviation occurred, and ' A subgame is a collection of branches of a game such that they start from the same node and the branches and the node together form a game tree by itself.° Under act/state independence, rationality as admissibiiity is entailed by rationality as expected utility maximization: a strictly dominated action is not a best reply to any possible subjective assessment, therefore an expected utility maximizer will never choose it. In this case further conditions should be imposed on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to obtain, whenever possible, a "ranking" of all the plausible explanations of deviations. To be able to eliminate all but one equilibrium and thus recommend a unique strategy for every player, game theorists must recommend a uniquely rational configuration of beliefs.
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To do so, it is not enough to assume beliefs to be internally consistent. It must be further assumed that belief-rationality is a property resulting from the procedure by which beliefs are obtained, and it must be shown that there exists a rational procedure for obtaining them. There are two equilibria, (c,L) and (a,R), and they are both perfect. In particular, (c,L) is perfect if player 2 believes that 1 will make mistake b with a higher probability than mistake a, but where both probabilities are very small, while the probability of 1 playing c will be close to one. If this is what 2 believes, then she should play L with probability close to one. But why should 2 believe that mistake b occurs with higher probability than mistake a? After all, both strategies a and c dominate b, so that there is little reason to expect mistake b to occur more frequently than mistake a. Equilibrium (c,L) is perfect, but it is not supported by More precisely, a perfect equilibrium can be obtained as a limit point of a sequence of equilibria of disturbed games in which the mistake probabilities go to zero. Thus each player's equilibrium strategy is optimal both against the equilibrium strategies of his opponents and some slight perturbations of these strategies (Selten 1975 Belief-rationality, however, cannot reduce to coherence, or to the condition that a conjecture ought not to be maintained in the face of evidence that refutes it.
These minimal rationality conditions are exploited by the sequential equilibrium notion (Kreps and Wilson 1982), which explicitly specifies beliefs at information sets lying off the equilibrium path. Briefly stated, a sequential equilibrium is a collection of belief-strategy pairs, one for each player, such that (i) each player has a belief (i.e., a subjective probability) over the nodes at each information set, and
(ii) at any information set, given a player's belief there and given the other players' strategies, his strategy for the remainder of the game maximizes his expected payoff. More specifically, suppose that a given equilibrium is agreed upon and a deviation occurs. When a player finds herself at an unexpected node she will try to reconstruct what went wrong, but usually she will not be able to tell at which point of her information set she is. This uncertainty is represented by posterior probabilities on the nodes in her information set. When she acts so as to maximize her expected utility with respect to these beliefs, the player assumes that in the rest of the game the original equilibrium is still being played.
A sequential equilibrium has the property that if the players behave according to conditions (i) and (ii), no
player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium at any information set. The problem with sequential equilibrium is that nothing is assumed about the plausibility of players 1 beliefs; that is, an equilibrium strategy must be optimal with respect to some beliefs, but not necessarily reasonable beliefs. So in the games in 
The process is defined thus: p 1 is the conditionalization of p on the sentence E if and only if, for every sentence H, p'(H) = p (H&E)/p(E). When p(E) = 0, the conditionalization is undefined. Since in our case a player who asks himself what
he would do were a deviation to occur is revising previously accepted beliefs (e.g., the belief that a given equilibrium is played), and accepting as new evidence a sentence E' whose prior probability is zero, conditionalization is not applicable in this context as a viable description of belief change. : 1977, 1980) . For an extensive discussion of these topics, see Gardenfors (1978 Gardenfors ( , 1986a . consistent contractions will contain too much, since for every sentence in L, either it or its negation will be in the revised belief set.
Some have argued that conditionalization can be defined even if p(E) =
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Since different contraction strategies will differ from one another with respect to the loss of informational value incurred, it seems reasonable to supplement maximal consistency with a criterion of minimum loss of informational value. In this case, it must be specified how sentences can be ordered according to their informational value or epistemic utility. If we assume that all the sentences in an agent's belief set have the same degree of acceptance, it will be impossible to set them apart in terms of probability, evidential support, or plausibility. 
